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v. 1 - 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of case: By their complaint, plaintiff buyers had sought specific performance of a 
purchase and sale agreement (R. pp. 19-27) respecting forty acres owned by defendants or, in the 
alternative, damages. The forty acres consists of a ten acre parcel on which defendants' residence 
is located and an adjacent thirty acre parcel (Tr. p. 161,ll. 5-9). During the course of litigation, 
plaintiffs allege that an oral settlement agreement had been entered into between the parties in which 
defendants agreed to pay plaintiffs $40,000 as consideration for the plaintiffs releasing defendants 
from the purchase and sale agreement. The alleged oral agreement contemplated an unwinding of 
the real estate transaction and that defendants execute a deed of trust to secure the indebtedness. The 
district court ruled that the oral agreement was enforceable (R. pp. 133-139) and entered judgment 
for plaintiffs. Now this appeal. 
Course of ~roceedings below: (1) Complaint andanswer: The complaint in this matter seeks 
specific performance, injunctive relief, contract damages, breach of the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing, and declaratory judgment (R. pp. 10-18). Defendants' answer denies the 
material allegations of the complaint and alleges the affirmative defense of duress (R. pp. 33-39). 
(2) Plaintiffs' motion for summaw iudgment: Plaintiffs filed amotion for summaryjudgment 
arguing that defendants had waived the November 30th closing date contained in the purchase and 
sale agreement (R. p. 23) by signing Addendum No. 3 which extended the closing date to December 
8" (R. p. 27). Based upon this alleged waiver, plaintiffs sought to specifically enforce the purchase 
and sale agreement. 
Plaintiffs did not sign Addendum No. 3 (R. pp. 27, 52), and defendants signed Addendum 
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No. 3 subsequent to the November 30th closing date (R. pp. 27, 52). In response to plaintiffs' 
motion, thqdistrict court denied the motion, ruling that the claim of waiver raised questions of fact 
not amenable to summary adjudication (R. p. 57). 
(3) Motion for reconsideration: Plaintiffs moved for reconsideration of the summary 
judgment denial. On reconsideration, the district court found that defendants had waived the 
November 30th closing deadline by signing Addendum No. 3 (R. p. 82). However the district court 
also ruled that there was a question of fact whether the defendants had signed Addendum No. 3 
under duress, and, therefore, refused to grant summary judgment (R. p. 80). 
(4) Evidentiarv bearing re enforceability of oral settlement agreement: Thereafter, plaintiffs 
filed a motion to enforce an alleged oral settlement agreement, arguing that defendant sellers had 
agreed to pay plaintiff buyers $40,000 (R. pp. 89-91) secured by a deed of trust on an unidentified 
parcel of property. The district court held an evidentiary hearing, granted this motion (R. pp. 133- 
139), and entered judgment against defendant buyers in the amount of $40,000 (R. p. 142). 
(5) Motion to vacate iudgment pursuant to Rule 59(e), 1.R.C.P: Defendants filed a motion 
to vacate the judgment based upon the following contentions: (1) because the oral settlement 
agreement contemplated a conveyance of an interest in real property (a deed of trust and the 
unwinding of areal estate transaction), it ran afoul ofthe statute of frauds, to wit, Idaho Code section 
9-503; and (2) because the alleged oral agreement pertained to the conveyance of an interest in real 
property and was entered into through defendants' attorney without defendants' written authority to 
do so, the oral agreement was unenforceable for this second and independent reason. Id 
The district court denied defendants' motionon the following grounds: (I) the oral agreement 
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was not a "land sale contract" but was an oral agreement for settlement of a lawsuit (R. p. 163); (2) 
an attorney's authorization to settle a lawsuit does not have to be in writing even where the 
settlement contemplates the conveyance of an interest in real estate, citing a 1988 New Hampshire 
case (R. p. 164); and (3) because the trial was vacated subsequent to the alleged oral agreement, this 
vacation constituted part performance taking the matter outside of the statute of frauds (R. p. 165). 
(6) Order denvine attorney fees: Plaintiffs sought attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code 
sections 12-120(3) and 12-121. The district court denied this motion on the grounds that the 
transaction was not a commercial transaction as contemplated by section 12-120(3) and that 
defendants' defense had not been frivolous. (R. pp. 165, 166). 
Statement of facts: (1) w: Plaintiffs and defendants entered into a purchase and sale 
agreement (R. pp. 19-27) for the sale to plaintiffs of defendants' real property which consisted oftwo 
parcels: a thirty acre parcel and an adjacent ten acre parcel on which defendants' residence was 
located (Tr. p. 161,ll. 5-9). The purchase and sale agreement had aNovember 30th closing date (R. 
p. 23). which required the plaintiff sellers to deposit "GOOD FUNDS" into escrow on that date (R. 
p. 20). The plaintiffs failed to deposit the sales proceeds in escrow by November 30th. (R. p. 23; 
Aug. R., Memorandum of Stipulated Facts). 
An Addendum No. 3 was drafted which, if executed, would extend the closing date to 
December 8Ih (R. p. 27). This addendum was signed by defendant Griffith on December 1" (one day 
after the closing deadline) and by defendant Porter on December 4'h (four days after the closing 
deadline). The plaintiffs did not sign Addendum No. 3 (R. p. 27). 
There is the assertion by plaintiffs that they obtained loan proceeds based upon defendants 
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executing the addendum, but there is no factual basis for this assertion. The district court noted this 
assertion in its Memorandum Decision and Order on Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and 
in its Memorandum Decision Re: Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider: 
However, the Plaintiffs raise the issue of waiver by asserting that the 
Defendants waived their rights to claim that payment was due on 
November 30 by signing Addendum No. 3. Plaintiffs further argue 
that Defendants waived their right to claim that Plaintiffs breached 
the Contract by failing to make the funds available on November 30. 
Plaintiffs assert that when they obtained the necessary funding on 
December 7, that they did so in reliance on the Defendants' alleged 
waiver. 
R. pp. 56,81 (emphasis added) 
That is, the record is devoid of any evidentiary basis for the asserted "reliance". In 
Memorandum of Stipulated Facts (Aug. R.)', it is acknowledged that the plaintiffs signed the 
purchase and sale agreement onNovember 30,2006 (paragraph 20). According to the Memorandum 
of Stipulated Facts (paragraph 25), as of December 5,2006, the "sales proceeds" had not been made 
available to defendant sellers as required by paragraph 20 of the purchase and sale agreement (R. p. 
Purported agreement to Day plaintiff buyers $40,000 secured bv a deed of trust:' On March 
5,2008, defendants met with their attorney Ron Shepherd (Tr. p. 12,ll. 16-22). Exhibit 4 are notes 
of that meeting. At that meeting, defendants gave Mr. Shepherd authority to make the offers 
 h his pleading, Memorandum of Stipulated Facts, is part of an augmentation of the record by 
Order Granting Motion to Augment Record dated April 8,2009. 
'The exhibits referenced in this section are part of the augmentation of the record by Order 
Granting Motion to Augment Record dated April 8,2009. 
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contained in Exhibit 5, a letter from Mr. Shepherd to plaintiffs' counsel (Tr. p. 19,ll. 1-10). The 
plaintiffs did not accept either of the offers contained in Exhibit 11 (Tr. p. 24,11. 14-18). Plaintiffs 
made acounteroffer of $50,000 to defendants' offer to pay plaintiff buyers $35,000 (Tr. p. 25,ll. 1- 
9). 
At the hearing on the enforceability of the oral agreement, plaintiffs called defendants' 
attorney Ron Shepherd to testify a s  to the March 5Ih conversations held with his clients, the 
defendants Griffith and Porter, e.g., Tr. p. 25,l. 10 to p. 26,l. 25.' Mr. Shepherd testified that his 
clients authorized him to settle the matter by payment of $40,000 to plaintiff buyers (Tr. p. 26,ll. 12- 
17). Mr. Shepherd and the plaintiffs contemplated that the deal would be consummated by the 
execution of a promissory note and deed of trust (Exhibit 6) 
Defendant Griffiths testified that he advised his attorney Ron Shepherd that he would attempt 
to borrow $40,000 but never accepted the $40,000 offer and was not aware of the proposed deed of 
trust: 
Q. Okay. And let me ask you to look at - well, let's talk about it a 
minute. So you left the office around noon. And then what happened 
next? What was your next communication with Mr. Shepherd? 
A. Well, I went to work from his office and Bomlie went home. It 
was her day off. And I was just about an hour within getting off work 
at 4:00, and I was unloading a rail car of propane and busy hooking 
it up, and my cell phone rang, and it was Ron. I-Ie said that he had 
reached an agreement with the other side and that they took your offer 
but not the one you thought. And I said, What do you mean? He said 
they want the money, but they want $50,000. And I said, No way. 
No way. And he said - I said, You mean they don't want the farm? 
3 ~ v l r .  Shepherd was allowed to withdraw as defendants' counsel by order dated April 17,2008 (R. 
p 86). 
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He said, No. They want the money. And I said, Well, I'm not going 
to go for no $$50,000. And he said, Okay. I'll get back to you. And 
he called back in two minutes and said - 
Q. Well, let's stop there. On that first telephone call was the only 
subject the discussion of the amount to be paid by you to Ogden and 
Hurst? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was there any discussion about how that - when that payment 
would be due or what manner it would paid? 
A. No. 
Q. Did he - had you seen at that point in time his letter to Mr. Kevin 
Dinius? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. So did youunderstand or know anything about the requirement for 
a Deed of Trust or any of those other provisions? 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. So he then calls back a couple of minutes later. What happened? 
A. He said that they would take $48,000. And he said - I said, Well, 
I ain't going to go for that either. And he said, Do you want to bump 
your offer at all? And I'm very busy. I'm putting hoses on box cars 
and hooking them up to trucks, and I said, Ron, if I can borrow 
$35,000 I guess I could borrow 40, but that's it. And he said, Okay. 
I'll get back with you. 
Q. Again, did you have any other discussioil about any other terns or 
provisions of the settlement? 
A. Nothing. 
Q. So what happened next? 
A. Well, about a minute or two he called me back. 
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Q. And what happened then? 
A. He said they'll take the 40. And I said, What? He said they'll 
settle for $40,000. And I said, Well, Ron, I'll get busy and see if I 
can borrow it. And he said, Well, I'll get this put in letter forin and 
have you approve it, and I said, Okay. 
Q. Well, when you said 1'11 get busy and borrow it, what did you 
mean by that? 
A. That I'd get busy and apply for a loan. 
Q. And why would you have to do that? 
A. In order to come up with the money. 
Q. And did he talk with you that his letter to Mr. Dinius had indicated 
that Ogden and I h s t  would accept a Deed of Trust and note pending 
payment in cash? 
A. No. 
Q. Did he ever mention a Deed of Trust or a note? 
A. No. He mentioned a Promissory Note earlier in the day in the 
meeting. 
Q. So what - was that the total, sum total of your discussion? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did he ever discuss with you a release of the lis pendens? 
A. No. 
Q. Did he talk with you about interest rate or time period for 
payment? 
A. No. I told him I was really busy. I was busy unhooking a rail car. 
Tr. p. 122,l. 12, top. 125,l. 14. 
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Defendant Porter's testimony was essentially the same as defendant Griffith (Tr. p. 159,l. 
4 top. 161,l. 16). That is, any offer by defendants was conditioned upon their getting a loan and that 
the deed of trust had not been discussed with their attorney. 
Exhibit 6 is a letter from defendants' attorney to plaintiffs' attorney confirming that an "oral 
agreement" had been reached on March 5,2008. The terms of the alleged oral settlement included 
a deed of trust to be executed by defendants in favor of plaintiffs as security. See Exhibit 6. The 
terms of the deed of trust and the identity of the real property were not addressed during the oral 
settlement discussions or in Exhibit 6. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the district court erred in ruling that an oral settlement agreement which 
contemplated the conveyance of an interest in real property was enforceable and not within the 
purview of the Statute of Frauds (Idaho Code section 9-503). 
2. Whether the district court erred in ruling that the authority of an attorney to settle a lawsuit 
does not have to be in writing under the Statute of Frauds even where the settlement contemplated 
a conveyance of an interest in real property. 
3. Whether the district court committed an error of law in applying the doctrine of part 
performance which resulted in a remedy, i.e., damages, which was not the equitable remedy of 
specific performance. 
4. Whether the district court's factual finding of part performance was clearly erroneous 
where plaintiffs' "performance", i.e., vacating the trial, was not reasonable, undertaken as it was 
prior to defendants' execution of the promissory note and deed of trust. 
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5. Whether, because the parties contemplated the execution of a promissory note and deed 
of trust as the consummation of their negotiations, the oral settlement agreement was not 
enforceable. 
6. With respect to the real estate purchase and sale agreement, whether defendant sellers 
waived their right to enforce the original closing deadline by signing an addendum extending the 
deadline at a point in time when the deadline had already expired. 
7. Whether the district court erred in entering partial summary judgment, finding waiver, 
when there existed genuine issues of material fact precluding summary adjudication. 
ARGUMENT 
Standard of review: (1) Waiver: With respect to the district court's partial summary 
judgment finding waiver, the Supreme Court applies the same standard as the district court, i.e., 
whether "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as amatter of law". Tower Asset Sub Inc. v. Lawrence, 143 Idaho 710,713,152 P.3d 581 
(2007), citing Rule 56(c), I.R.C.P. The facts are to be liberally construed in favor of the defendants, 
as opposing parties, who are also given the benefit of all favorable inferences. Thomas v. Campbell, 
107 Idaho 398,690 P.2d 333 (1984). 
In some non-jury matters, the judge in summary proceedings is free to arrive at the most 
probable inferences from uncontroverted evidentiary facts. Fullerton v. Griswold, 142 Idaho 820, 
825,136 P.3d 291 (2006). However, this judicial freedom is restrained here by the requirement that 
waiver cannot be inferred. Recordsteel & Const, Inc., v. Martel, 129 Idaho 288,289,923 P.2d 995 
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(1996). 
(2) Applicability of the Statute of Frauds and the doctrine of part performance: With respect 
to the applicability of the Statute of Frauds to this undisputedly oral settlement agreement, the 
interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which the Supreme Court exercises fkee review. 
State v. Quick Transport, 134 Idaho 240,244,999 P.2d 895 (2000). 
(3) Finding of part verforman~e:~ The factual finding ofpart performance cannot be set aside 
unless it is "clearly erroneous". Rule 50(b), I.R.C.P. That is, if the district court's findings are 
supported by "substantial and competent, though conflicting, evidence" the finding must stand. 
Muniz v. Schrader, 115 Idaho 497,500,767 P.2d 1272 (Ct. App. 1989). 
Summary of argument: (1) Unenforceability of oral settlement agreement: 
(a) The oral agreement contemplates the unwinding of a real estate transaction and 
the execution of a deed of trust in favor of the buyer plaintiffs in order to secure the payment by 
defendant sellers of $40,000. This transaction contemplates the transfer of an interest in real 
property which, by section 9-503 of the Idaho Code, must be in writing to be enforceable. 
(b) The alleged oral agreement was reached, not by defendant buyers, but by their 
attorney who lacked the written authority required by section 9-503 to enter into an agreement 
involving the conveyance of an interest in real property. 
(c) Part performance, when established, yields an equitable remedy - specific 
performance of the oral agreement. Tew v. Manwaring, 94 Idaho 50, 480 P.2d 896 (1971). Here 
4~trictly speaking, the district court's Findings of Fact did not conclude there was part 
performance (R. pp. 134-136). Rather this conclusion was reached in its Memorandum Decision upon 
Rule 59(e) (R. pp 164, 165). 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 1 I 
plaintiff buyers' major goal is not specific performance; rather, they are seeking money damages. 
Where the doctrine of part performance would yield a remedy unsuited to the purpose for which the 
doctrine was designed (equitable relief), the Supreme Court will decline to apply it. IBM v. 
Lawhorn, 106 Idaho 194,199,677 P.2d 507 (1984). 
(d) The factual finding of part performance was clearly erroneous because, as in 
estoppel, the performance (or reliance) must be reasonable, and plaintiffs' performance was not 
reasonable, i.e., vacating the trial date prior to defendants' execution ofthe contemplated promissory 
note and deed of trust. Treasure Valley Gastroenterology Specialists v. v. Woods, 135 Idaho 485, 
489,20 P.3d 21 (2001). 
(e) The oral agreement lacked the requisite specificity to be enforceable, e.g., 
identification of the parcel of defendants' property to be subject to a deed of trust and the tenns of 
the deed of trust. Lettunich v. Key Bank, 141 Idaho 362,367, 109 P.3d 1 I04 (2005). 
(f) Because the parties intended to consummate the alleged oral seniement agreement 
with an executed promissory note and deed of trust, the oral settlement agreement was not 
enforceable. Thompson v. Pike, 122 Idaho 690,696,838 P.2d 293 (1992). 
(2) Absence of waiver as a matter of law: In granting plaintiff buyers' partial summary 
judgment, the district court ruled that defendants had waived their right to require a November 30th 
closing date by signing Addendum No. 3. Plaintiff buyers have failed to marshal facts that they (a) 
acted in reliance upon defendants' alleged waiver and that (b) whatever that reliance was, it was 
reasonable. Dennettv. Kuenzli, 130 Idaho 21,936 P.2d 219 (1997). That is, there is no evidence that 
plaintiffs took any actions based upon defendants signing Addendum No. 3 (R. p. 27) which was 
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drafted to extend the closing deadline. Further, the evidence is lacking that plaintiffs' reliance, if it 
did occur, was reasonable. On the contrary, the failure of plaintiffs to sign Addendum #3 suggests 
that it was not reasonable for them to rely on a document which contemplated full execution by all 
parties. 
(3) The issue of waiver vresents a genuine issue of material fact which cannot be resolved 
bv summarv adjudication. Even assuming there are facts which support the existence of waiver by 
defendants, the issues of reliance by plaintiffs and the reasonableness of that reliance present factual 
issues not amenable to summary judgment. Rule 56(c), I.R.C.P. 
THE JUDGMENT IS AGAINST THE LAW AND SHOULD BE SET ASIDE BECAUSE THE 
ORAL SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT IS SUBJECT TO THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
The oral settlement agreement contemplated the transfer of an interest in real propert-v and 
is unenforceable as within the Statute of Frauds: At its base, the settlement agreement contemplated 
the (1) unwinding of a real estate transaction and (2) the execution of a deed of trust. As such, the 
agreement must be in writing in order to be enforceable. Section 9-503 states in pertinent part: 
No estate or interest in real property, other than for leases for a term 
not exceeding one (1) year, nor any trust or power over or concerning 
it, or in any mannerrelating thereto, can be created, granted, assigned, 
surrendered, or declared, otherwise than by operation of law, or a 
conveyance or other instrument in writing, subscribed by the party 
creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or 
by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing. 
The Court found that the settlement agreement between the parties "incorporat[ed] as a term 
and condition of settlement, the idea of a deed of trust . . ." (R. p. 136). That is, as a security 
device, the agreement required defendants to execute a deed of trust in plaintiffs' favor. According 
to Black's Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition, p. 423, a deed of trust is defined as: "A deed conveying 
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title to real property to a trustee as security until the grantor repays the loan". Because the settlement 
contemplated the transfer of interest in real property, the settlement agreement must be in writing 
to be enforceable. 
Also, an indispensable provision in any settlement between plaintiffs and defendants, whether 
oral or written, would be that plaintiffs grant to defendants any interest plaintiffs claim in the subject 
real property, arising from the earnest money agreement. This term is also within the statute of 
fiauds and unenforceable absent a writing. Even without the deed of trust issue, the settlement 
agreement contemplates the unwinding of a real estate transaction and is subject to the statute of 
frauds 
The statute of frauds pertains to all agreements concerning the conveyance of an interest in 
real property, including settlement agreements. Idaho law is clear that when the subject of a 
settlement agreement falls within the proscription of the statute of frauds that agreement must be in 
writing. Olson v. Dept ' of Water Resources, 105 Idaho 98,666 P.2d 188 (1983) 
Thus, if the oral stipulation entered into in this case was an executory 
contract establishing and declaring water rights, it is a contract falling 
within the statue of frauds and is unenforceable in the absence of a 
writing. See Sinzs v. Purcell, 74 Idaho 109,257 P.2d 242 (1953) (oral 
compromise agreements within the statute of frauds unless taken out 
by part performance); Francis v. Green, 7 Idaho 668, 65 P. 362 
(1901) (oral settlement contract to convey water rights within statute 
of frauds unless taken out by part performance). 
105 Idaho at 101 
When the parties to a real estate contract attemvt to include a security provision. that 
provision becomes an essential term of the contract. Its omission is fatal to the creation of an 
enforceable agreement. That is, oral evidence is not admissible to establish the mode of security 
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Lawrence v. Jones, 124 Idaho 748,75 1,864 P.2d 194 (App. 1993). In Lawrence, the Court held that 
a failed attempt to include a security provision in a written contract constitutes the omission an 
"essential" term of the agreement: "Although a real estate contract need not contain a security 
provision if none is contemplated, once parties attempt to provide for security, it becomes an 
essential term of the contract". Id. 124 Idaho at 75 1. 
Likewise here: the deed of trust provision is essential. Absent a writing respecting this 
provision, an essential term is missing and the settlement agreement is unenforceable. 
EVEN HAD THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT BEEN IN WRITING. IT WOULD 
NOT HAVE BEEN ENFORCEABLE BECAUSE THE AUTHORIZATION OF 
DEFENDANTS' AGENT WAS ITSELF NOT REDUCED TO A WRITING 
Paragraphs 2, 4 and 7 of the Findings of Fact describe the settlement negotiations which 
occurred betweenplaintiffs, on the one hand, and defendants' attorney (Mr. Shepherd), on the other. 
There is no writing which endows Mr. Shepherd with the authority to agree to execute a deed of trust 
or otherwise unwind the real property transaction on behalf of the defendants. Because the 
settlement agreement was subject to the statute of frauds, Mr. Shepherd's authority to act can only 
he conferred by a writing executed by the defendants. According to Idaho Code section 9-503: "No 
estate or interest in real property . . . can be created . . . otherwise than by operation of law 
or a conveyance or other instrument in writing subscribed by the party . . . or by his lawful agent 
thereunto authorized by writing." There is no evidence of such written authority in the case at bench. 
This principle of law is noted in the Restatement of Agency, Second, section 28: "Except as 
stated in Subsection (2), an instrument executed by an agent as a sealed instrument does not operate 
as such unless authority or apparent authority to execute it has been conferred by an instrument under 
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seal." 
In Arthur v. Kilpatrick Brothers, 47 Idaho 306,274 Pac. 800 (1929), a power of attorney 
contained no authority to convey real estate. The Court concluded that "the deed to Catherine J. 
Arthur was ineffective by reason of insufficiency of the power of attorney to authorize conveyance 
of real estate". Id. 47 Idaho at 31 1. See also Johnson v. Sage, 4 Idaho 758,764,44 Pac. 641 (1896). 
In Central Idaho Agency v. Turner, 92 Idaho 306,307,443 P.2d 442 (1968), the record did 
not show that "defendant's attorney was "authorized in writing" to act as defendant's agent in 
making an agreement for the sale of the property", citing Idaho Code section 9-503. The Idaho 
Supreme Court held there was no enforceable agreement as respects the attorney's purported 
agreement on his client's behalf. The Central Idaho Agency case affirms the mandate of the statute 
that an agent's authority must be in writing in order for him to convey an interest in real property. 
The district court ruled that where a client has given the attorney authority to settle litigation 
the Statute of Frauds does not require that the authorization be in writing, even where the settlement 
involves a conveyance of an interest in real property, citing Halstead v. Murray, 547 A.2d 202 (N 
H. 1988) (R. p. 163, 164). This conclusion is, essentially, a re-writing of that portion of the Statute 
of Frauds cited above which requires, in those cases in which the Statute applies, that the agent's 
authority also be in writing in order to bind his principal. 
The district court' reliance on Halstead is misplaced as was recognized in a subsequent New 
Hampshire case, Byhlos Corporation v. Salem Farm Realty Trust, 692 A.2d 514 (N. H. 1997). A 
settlement agreement in the litigation context presents an a fortiori circumstance for the application 
for the Statute of Frauds: 
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In the present appeal, however, we must address the need for a 
writing between adverse parties to a settlement agreement negotiated 
by counsel when their agreement involves the transfer of an interest 
in land. Tke policy reasons for tlze statute of@auds are never more 
evident than when opposing litigants come together to thrash out 
their dijierences. . . .Unlike the situation at issue in Bock and 
Halstead, in which the attorney and client enjoyed a special status 
underscored by a complete unity of interest, the current case involves 
litigants with divergent interests and incentives. In addition, the 
policy behind the legislature's enactment of the statute, see Weale, 
117 N.H. at 431, 374 A.2d at 928, must necessarily inform this 
court's otherwise liberal policy of enforcing settlement agreements. 
. . .While it is true that attorneys are deemed to be officers of the 
court, . . . their involvement in a transaction does not, in and of itseg 
eclipse the need for certainty in land titles to such an extent that the 
commands of the legislature can be overlooked. 
Id. 692 A.2d at 5 17 (emphasis added). 
Byblos narrowed the scope of Halstead v. Murray, particularly, as here, where settlement is 
sought to be enforced in the context of a litigated matter, i.e., "the policy reasons for the statute of 
frauds are never more evident than when opposing litigants come together to thrash out their 
differences". Id. 692 A.2d at 5 17. 
Finally, it should be noted that the Halstead court conceded that New Hampshire's "rule 
regarding the power of an attorney to bind his client by settlement is, perhaps, the most liberal in the 
country", citing Ducey v. Corey, 355 A.2d 426,427 (N.H. 1976). Id. 547 A.2d 204. 
THE DOCTRINE OF PART PERFORMANCE IS NOT AVAILABLE TO EXEMPT 
THE PURPORTED AGREEMENT FROM THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
The application of: 
under the contract seekadamage remedy. not specific uerfomance. The district court ruled, quoting 
from plaintiffs' brief, that "it is appropriate to use [the court's] equitable powers to invoke the 
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doctrine of part performance or equitable estoppel to enforce the settlement agreement" (R. p. 165). 
The district court saw the statute of frauds as not applicable because of the plaintiffs' partial 
performance, i.e., vacating the trial. (R. p. 165). 
The remedy sought by plaintiffs is damages. The Supreme Court is loath to impose the 
doctrine of part performance where the remedy sought is not specific performance. 
However, specific performance is not the remedy sought by Lawhorn 
in his counterclaim. Rather, he has prayed for damages, allegedly 
caused by the company's failure to buy the property, in a sum of 
$200,000 - a figure bearing no apparent relationship to his equity in 
the property. . . . It is clear that Lawhorn does not seek by his 
counterclaim to enforce a sale of the property to IBM. Because the 
doctrine of part performance would yield a remedy unsuited to the 
purpose for which the doctrine is urged in this case, we decline to 
apply it. 
IBMv. Lawhorn, 106 Idaho 194, 199,677 P.2d 507 (App. 1984). See also Tew v. Manwaring, 94 
Idaho 50,52,480 P.2d 896 (1971). 
Underscoring the inapplicability of the doctrine of part performance to the factual setting here 
is a long line of cases. These cases allow part performance as an exemption to the statute of frauds 
but require that the "improvements made by a party and upon which they (sic) rely for part 
performance must be substantial in relation to the value of the property". Hoffman v. S. V: Co., Inc., 
102 Idaho 187, 191,628 P.2d 218 (1981). See also Boesiger v. Freer, 85 Idaho 551,381 P.2d 802 
(1 963). Plaintiffs' so-called part performance was vacating the trial which had nothing to do with the 
real property, 
The district court was clearlv erroneous in its finding that the vlaintiffs' conduct constituted 
partial verformance of the oral agreement: The district court correctly compared the doctrine of part 
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performance to the doctrine of equitable estoppel (R. p. 165). Under both doctrines, the party seeking 
relief must demonstrate that his conduct was reasonable under the circumstances. See Lettunich v. 
Key Bank 141 Idaho362,367, 109 P.3d 1104 (2005). Partial performance is a specific form of the 
more general principle of equitable estoppel. Treasure Valley Gastroenterology Specialists v. Wood 
135 Idaho 485,486,20 P.3d 21 (2001). Whether partial performance or reliance in the estoppel 
setting, the conduct of the party seeking relief must be reasonable. 
The district court viewed plaintiffs' vacation of the trial as sufficient partial performance to 
remove the oral agreement from the requirements of the Statute of Frauds (R. p. 165). Even assuming 
that vacating the trial had relevance to the doctrine of partial performance, this conduct by plaintiffs, 
undertaken prior to execution of the promissory note, was not reasonable. That is, vacating the trial 
date was not compelled by defendants or external circumstances. Nor was vacating the trial part of 
the so-called oral agreement and contemplated to be done prior to signing the documents. 
There is neither substantial nor competent evidence that plaintiffs' vacation of the trial was 
necessary or reasonable. Given the clearly erroneous finding to the contrary, the district court's 
application of the doctrine of part performance must be set aside under Rule 52(a), I.R.C.P. 
The doctrine of part performance is not applicable here because the so-called oral agreement is 
not complete and certain in all its material terms: The prospective terms of the deed of trust in this 
matter have not been memorialized or otherwise articulated. Accordingly, it is impossible to fashion 
a meaningful order for specific performance. The following terms of the deed of trust are unknown: 
right to prepay, right to inspection, protection of trust beneficiary's rights in the event of litigation, 
payment of all charges that may become liens, assignment (or not) of condemnation proceeds, and 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 19 
whether successor and assigns are bound 
Additionally, the record reflects that defendants' real property is comprised of two separate 
parcels (Tr. p. 161,ll. 5-9). The real property subject to the deed of trust has not been identified. These 
disabilities render it impossible to re-construct the intention of the parties and, in turn, enforce the so- 
called agreement. These same defects were encountered in Lettunich v. Key Bank, 141 Idaho 362,109 
P.3d 1104 (2005) and made enforcement of the agreement impossible. 
To be specifically enforced by operation of the doctrine of part 
performance, an oral agreement "must be complete, definite and certain 
in all its material terms, or contain provisions which are capable in 
themselves of being reduced to certainty" Bear Island Water Ass 'n, Inc. 
v. Brown, 125 Idaho 717,723,874 P.2d 528,534 (1994). 
Even though it could be inferred that Lettunich partially performed by 
purchasing cattle at the sale, there is no evidence in the record of a 
complete and enforceable agreement. For example, there is no 
indication of the amount of the loan, the interest rate, the disbursement 
schedule, the terms of repayment, the security for the loan, or the 
parties ' rights a$er default. While none of these terms individually may 
be determinative, the lack of all of them in this case makes the oral 
agreement to lend money vague, incomplete and unenforceable. 
Consequently, the doctrine ofpart performance does not apply to this 
case. 
For the same reason, the doctrine of equitable estoppel does not apply. 
Equitable estoppel assumes the existence of a complete agreement, 
which is lacking here. Therefore, we need not address the issue of 
whether equitable estoppel even applies as an exception to I.C. § 9- 
505(5). The district court's holding that part performance and equitable 
estoppel do not apply is affirmed. 
141 Idaho at 367 (emphasis added). 
Also, see Watson v. Watson, 144 Idaho 214,159 P.3d 85 1 (2007), where the oral agreement was 
not definite regarding what property was included in the sale, specific performance could not be 
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imposed. 
In Chapin v. Linden, 144 Idaho 393, 162 P.3d 772 (2007), parties had agreed on price, down 
payment, amortization and time for final payments. However, they continued to negotiate on two other 
issues: partial deed-release provisions and pre-payment penalty provisions. The Supreme Court ruled 
that there was no meeting of the minds because these material provisions had not been agreed to. In 
turn, absent a meeting of the minds, the issue of part performance did not have to be reached (Id. 144 
Idaho at 397). The Chapin court cited Lawrence v. Jones, 124 Idaho 748,863 P.2d 194 (1993) which 
held that "once parties attempt to provide for security it becomes as essential term of the contract" Id 
144 Idaho at 397. 
Likewise, in the case at bench. The oral agreement called for a deed of trust. Given the myriad 
of issues presented by a deed of trust, including the identification of the property to be burdened, it 
is not possible for a court to enforce the agreement, by specific performance or otherwise. A judicial 
revision of the agreement is not condoned by this Court. Freiburgev v. J-U-B Engineers, 14 1 Idaho 4 15, 
423, 11 1 P.3d 100 (2005). 
BECAUSE THE PARTIES INTENDED THE EXECUTION OF DOCUMENTS TO 
CONSUMMATE THE AGREEMENT. THE ORAL AGREEMENT IS NOT ENFORCEABLE 
It is undisputed that plaintiffs are seeking to enforce an oral settlement agreement. See Exhibit 
12 (Aug. R.). It is also undisputed that the purported oral settlement agreement contemplated that the 
parties would execute a promissory note and deed of trust. Under Idaho law, "an oral agreement is not 
valid if the parties view the written draft as a consummation of the negotiation". Thompson v. Pike, 
122 Idaho 690, 696, 838 P.2d 293 (1992). In Thompson, the Court looked at the following criteria to 
ascertain the intent of the parties: 
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The intent to have a written contract is shown by factors such as: (1) 
whether the contract is one usually put in writing, (2) whether there are 
few or many details, (3) whether the amount involved is large or small, 
(4) whether it requires a formal writing for a full expression of the 
covenants and promises, and (5) whether the negotiations indicate that 
a written draft is contemplated as the final conclusion of negotiations. 
The burden of proof is on the party asserting that the contract was 
binding before the written draft was signed. 
Id 122 Idaho at 696 
The case at bench has all the criteria that indicate a written document was intended by the 
parties. Foremost among these criteria is that the purported oral agreement contemplated the execution 
of a promissory note and deed oftrust. See Exhibit 12 (Aug. R.). Accordingly, the oral agreement is 
not enforceable. 
ABSENT REASONABLE RELIANCE UPON DEFENDANTS' EXECUTION OF 
ADDENDUM NO. 3, A WAIVER OF DEFENDANTS' RIGHTS UNDER THE 
PURCHASE AND SALE AGREEMENT DID NOT OCCUR 
The district court failed to address the reliance issues: Plaintiffs argue that by signing 
Addendum No. 3 "defendants waived their right to claim that plaintiffs breached the contract by failing 
to make the funds available on November 30", and that "when they obtained the necessary funding on 
December 7, that they did so in reliance on defendants' alleged waiver" (R. p. 81). 
In response to plaintiffs' first motion for summary judgment on this issue, district court found 
that there were issues of fact precluding suminary adjudication (R. p. 45). In response to their second 
motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of waiver, the district court again found questions 
of fact existed and denied the motion (R. p. 57). On plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration, the district 
found the existence of waiver: 
Based upon the above facts, the court concludes that Griffith either knew 
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what his options were regarding the signing of the extension by virtue 
of the legal advice he and Porter had obtained, or he should have known. 
For this reason, the Court finds that waiver has been established by his 
conduct of signing. 
R. p. 82. 
The district court did not identify any factual basis to support a conclusion that plaintiffs' relied 
upon the defendants' execution of AddendumNo. 3 and that such reliance was reasonable. The district 
court merely references plaintiffs' assertion: "Plaintiffs assert that when they obtained the necessary 
funding on December 7, that they did so in reliance on defendants' alleged waiver (R. p. 81). It is 
undisputed that plaintiffs themselves did not sign Addendum No. 3. 
The district court did not enter judgment against defendants because the defense ofduress raised 
questions of fact (R. p. 83), and duress, if shown, would neutralize defendants' waiver. 
Absence of waiver as a matter of law: The record does not show the date plaintiffs obtained the 
financing, the name of the lender, the amount of the financing obtained, or what detrimental reliance 
was incurred. 
To establish waiver, the party invoking the doctrine must show detrimental reliance: 
A wavier is a "a voluntary, intentional relinquishment of a known right 
or advantage," and the party asserting the waiver "must show that he 
acted in reasonable reliance upon it and he thereby has altered his 
position to his detriment." 
Fullerton v. Griswold, 142 Idaho 820,824,136 P.3d 291 (2006). See also Ada County Highway District 
v. TSI, 145 Idaho 360,370, 179 P.3d 323 (2008). 
The record contains no facts which would support a finding of reliance. The district court's 
reference to reliance is limited to what "plaintiffs assert" (R. p. 81). 
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Defendants concede that in some non-jury matters, the judge in summary judgment proceedings 
is entitled to arrive at the most probable inferences to be drawn from uncontroverted evidentiary facts. 
Loomis v. City of Hailey, 119 Idaho 434, 437, 807 P.2d 1272 (1991). However, in the instance of 
alleged waiver, the existence of waiver cannot be inferred. Jones v. Maestas, 108 Idaho 69,696 P.2d 
920 (1985). In any event, there are no facts, uncontroverted or otherwise, which would support a finding 
of detrimental reliance, an essential element of waiver. In this case, plaintiffs argued, without evidence, 
that they reasonably relied upon defendants signing Addendum No. 3 without bothering to sign the 
addendum themselves. Given this omission, it is not a stretch of logic to observe that plaintiffs' reliance 
was not reasonable. 
At the top of Addendum No. 3 is the following cautionary language: "THIS IS A LEGALLY 
BINDING CONTRACT . . CONSULT YOUR ATTORNEY AND/OR ACCOUNTANT 
BEFORE SIGNING . , "Addendum" means that the information below is added material for the 
agreement" (R. p. 27) (emphasis and all-capitals in original). There are signature lines at the bottom of 
the Addendum No. 3 for the sellers and buyers. Plaintiff sellers failed to sign the addendum. 
The language printed on Addendum No. 3 makes it clear that absent a fully executed addendum 
the terms of the addendum do not become "added material for the agreement". Accordingly, it was not 
reasonable for plaintiffs to rely on a partially executed addendum. 
THF ISSUl: OF WAIVER I'RESENTS A GENUINE ISSUI: O r  hlATERIAL FACT 
WIIICII CANNOT BE KESOLVFD BY S1JMMr\I<Y ADJIJDlCA I'ION 
At the very least, the district court's partial summary judgment to the effect that the conduct of 
defendants constituted waiver is a factual finding which violates the strictures of Rule 56(c), I.R.C.P. 
Waiver is a question of fact which requires a showing of reliance, and "substantial evidence" is required 
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to make a sufficient showing. A &B Irrigation Dist. v. Aberdeen-American Falls Ground Water Dist., 
141 Idaho 746,754,118 P.3d 86 (2005). Whether a party's reliance was reasonable is a factual question 
for the trier of fact, not summary judgment proceedings. Shoup v. Union Sec Liji Ins. Co., 142 Idaho 
152, 155, 124 P.3d 1028 (2005). 
When the district court denied both plaintiffs' motions for partial summary judgment on the 
waiver issue, it observed that "there are genuine issues of material fact which preclude summary 
judgment" (R. p. 45) and "it is for the trier of fact to determine whether the evidence establishes waivcr" 
(R. p. 57). Inexplicably, the district court reversed itself in partially granting plaintiffs' motion for 
reconsideration (R. p. 80, 82). 
CONCLUSION 
(1) Unenforceabilitv of oral settlement agreement: 
(a) The oral agreement contemplates the unwinding of a real estate transaction and the 
execution of a deed of trust in favor of the buyer plaintiffs in order to secure the payment by defendant 
sellers of $40,000. According to the Statute of Frauds, an agreement to convey an interest in real 
property must be in writing to be enforceable. The oral agreement is unenforceable for the additional 
reason that the authority of defendants' attorney to negotiate this settlement was not in writing as 
required by the Statute of Frauds. 
(b) Part performance, when established, yields an equitable remedy - specific 
performance of the oral agreement. Plaintiffs sought and obtained a money judgment. Where the 
doctrine of part performance yields a remedy (money damages) unsuited to the purpose for which the 
doctrine was designed (equitable relief), it cannot be applied. 
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(c) The factual finding that plaintiffs partly performed because they vacated the trial date 
is cleariy erroneous on two levels: (1) in vacating the trial prior to execution of the promissory note and 
deed of trust, plaintiffs did not act reasonably; and (2) in this real property dispute, the so-called part 
performance had nothing to do with the real property. 
(d) The oral agreement lacked the requisite specificity to be enforceable, e.g., the 
identification of defendants' real property to be subject to a deed of trust and the terms of the deed of 
trust. 
(e) Because the parties intended to consummate the alleged oral settlement agreement 
with an executed promissory note and deed of trust, the oral settlement agreement was not enforceable. 
(2) Absence ofwaiver as a matter of law: In granting plaintiff buyers' partial summary judgment, 
the dislrict court ruled that defendants had waived their right to require aNovember 30th closing date by 
signing Addendum No. 3. Plaintiff buyers have failed to marshal facts that: (a) they acted in reliance 
upon defendants' alleged waiver and, (b) whatever that reliance was, it was reasonable. 
(3) The issue of waiver vresents a zenuine issue of material fact which cannot be resolved by 
summarv adiudication. Even assuming there are facts which support the existence of waiver by 
defendants, the issues of reliance by plaintiffs and the reasonableness of that reliance present factual 
issues not amenable to summary judgment. 
Defendants respectfully request that the judgment be vacated and that the matter be remanded 
to the district court for further proceedings. 
1 
1 
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Respectfully submitted this ISth day of April, 2009. 
Allen B M l i x  
Attorney for DefendantsIAppellants 
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